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The SEC's Role in the Global Era: How the
SEC Will Protect U.S. Investors in Foreign
Markets
DEREK W. KACZMAREK*

INTRODUCTION

Globalization has affected the political, economic, social, and technological
spheres of the Earth.' Globalization's reach is also extending to and
transforming the world's financial sector, creating 2 the potential for a
redistribution of wealth among countries throughout the world3 by enabling
people to invest in, and profit from, other countries, regions, and continents.
Up to this point, corporations have been the primary international investors and
have accomplished this through direct foreign investment.4 With the growth of

* J.D. Candidate, 2002, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.A. History, 1997, DePauw
University. I would like to thank Professors Hanna Buxbaum and William Hicks for their support, guidance,
and invaluable suggestions, Dean Alfred C. Aman, Jr. and Professor Jost Delbrtck for their early suggestions
and explanations of globalization, and Katrina Kaczmarek for her encouragement and sympathetic ear.
I. See David Held & Anthony McGrew, The Great Globalization Debate, in THE GLOBAL
TRANSFORMATIONS READER: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE GLOBALIZATION DEBATE 3 (David Held &
Anthony McGrew eds., 2000).
2. See The Emerging Structure of U.S. Securities Markets and the AppropriateRole for Regulation:
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 106th Cong. 21 (2000)
[hereinafter Hearings] (opening statement of Richard A. Grasso, Chairman and CEO, New York Stock
Exchange) (noting how globalization, among other factors, is having a profound effect on financial markets).
3. Held & McGrew, supranote 1, at 57.
4. See, e.g., Robert T. Kudrle, Market Globalizationandthe FuturePolicies of the IndustrialStates, in
GLOBALIZATION AND GOVERNANCE 213, 218 (Aseem Prakash & Jeffrey A. Hart eds., 1999)
The flow [oftransborder financial activity] now exceeds $1 trillion a day. While that
growth has been encouraged by volatile exchange rates and largely made possible by
the communications revolution, the virtual unanimity with which the industrialized
countries have abolished capital controls (France and Italy as recently as 1986)
provided the necessary policy conditions. The actions were taken to complement the
commitment to the globalization of trade. Direct investment provides the vehicle for
much international production and exchange, and the increasingly frictionless
exchange of currencies facilitates such activity.
Id. (citations omitted); see also STEPHEN GILL & DAVID LAW, THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY:

PERSPECTIVES, PROBLEMS, AND POLICIES 92 (1988) (discussing the ease with which capital flows between the
major capitalist economies).
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technology and simplification of trading due to the Internet,5 individual
investors are clamoring for the opportunity to reach beyond their native country
and benefit from the world's economy. 6 The world's securities markets are one
of the primary mechanisms for individuals to invest in foreign countries.
Arthur Levitt, former Chairman of the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), predicted, "[t]he marketplace of the future will almost
certainly be more global and more electronic. I have said over and over again
that I fully expect 7within the next 5 years that we will be part of a global
electronic market.",
One of the potential pitfalls for U.S. investors in this future global market,
however, is a lack of understanding of foreign countries' securities markets and
the different rules used by their respective regulatory agencies. 8 As Senator
McLaughlin noted, "[t]he globalization of capital markets has raised a host of
regulatory and accounting issues." 9
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the different ways in which the SEC
and other world regulatory agencies can protect U.S. investors as they enter into
the unfamiliar markets of foreign countries.' 0 Primarily, how will the SEC
5. See Laura S. Unger, The Global Marketplace, Ready or Not Here It Comes, Remarks at the Third
at
2000),
24,
(Jan.
Conference
the
Internet
on
Trading
Securities
National
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch344.htm ("Telecommunications networks have extinguished any truly
discernible differences between sending an order from New York to Chicago, London, or Tokyo.... The
only real impediments to a global market are regulatory, not technological.").
6. These benefits include "providing new savings pools, reducing capital costs, and furnishing new
investment opportunities." A.B. Krongard, Chairman, Securities Industry Association Task Force on
Alternative Trading System Concept Release, Comments to SEC Concept Release File No. S7-16-97, at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/s7l697/krongarl.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2002).
7. Hearings,supra note 2, at 173 (opening statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission).
8. The primary difficulties are the individual investor's assumptions that the foreign securities market will
follow the same rules as the markets in the United States, which are regulated by the SEC in a more stringent
manner than most other markets. A few of the differences are the lack of a "fair playing field" in terms of a
greater acceptance of insider trading or the lack of transparency and full disclosure by corporations (compare
the United States to Japan, although the differences have decreased after the Asian market crisis). This is not
a problem limited to unsophisticated investors. Kenneth Kaoma Mwenda details some of the problems
sophisticated multinational corporations face when deciding on foreign direct investment into Third World
countries like Zambia. See KENNETH KAOMA MWENDA, CONTEMPORARY ISSUES INCORPORATE FINANCE
AND INVESTMENT LAW 34-42 (2000).

9. Reid Anthony Muoio, An Independent Auditor's Suitfor Wrongful Discharge,58 ALB L. REV. 413,
420 n.41 (1994) (referring the reader to Joseph McLaughlin, ListingForeignStocks on US. Exchanges: Time
to Confront Reconciliation?, 24 REV. SEC. & COMM. REG. 91, 91 (1991) (arguing that "the SEC's
requirement that foreign issuers reconcile their financial disclosures to U.S. GAAP has impeded
internationalization of U.S. markets ... ")).
10. The motivations of the different regulatory organizations, including the SEC and foreign exchange
regulators, will be discussed in Part MI.
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protect U.S. investors as they invest in foreign markets while, presumably,
expecting those markets to operate in the same manner as the U.S. securities
markets?
Three different proposals were put forth by the SEC in a concept release
paper in 1997 and, to this date, the SEC has taken no further steps to implement
any of the proposals. Each of the proposals will be analyzed for strengths and
weaknesses as viewed through the lens of globalization theories.
Part I will examine globalization's influence on the flow of capital and the
differences between regulations in the United States and in foreign countries.
Part II will look at the SEC's specific role in the regulation of securities and
will explain why the SEC can and should be involved in the global regulation
of securities when U.S. investors are involved. Part III will look at where U.S.
investors fit into this equation. Specifically, I will explain why foreign markets
would be willing to follow SEC guidelines to gain U.S. investment dollars.
Part IV will provide an analysis of the three SEC proposals: mutual
recognition, exchange regulation, and access regulation." Each of these
proposals will be described and then analyzed for advantages and
disadvantages. After looking at the pros and cons, I will discuss the problems
the SEC may face in implementing the plans. Finally I will assess the
likelihood of success of each proposal by placing each of the proposals into the
applicable globalization theories.
I. GLOBALIZATION'S EFFECT ON THE WORLD'S SECURITIES MARKETS
A. How GlobalizationInfluences the Flow of Capital
While the world shrinks because of globalization, the flow of capital has
become more rapid. This is due to improving technology like the Internet, fiber
optics, satellites, and cellular communications, 12 the increase in investment
opportunities worldwide,13 and an overall improvement in the dissemination of
information and news through sources like CNN and the Internet. In fact, some
theorists point out that money can flow so quickly as to impact an individual
II. These three terms will be adequately explained in the body of the paper. For definitions of the
individual terms mutual recognition, exchange regulation, and access regulation, see infra Part IV.A-C.
12. See Unger, supranote 5 (discussing the improvement in worldwide telecommunications networks that
has led to the ability to trade securities on a global basis).
13. See GILL & LAW, supra note 4, at 92 (discussing investment opportunities on a worldwide basis,
especially between the major capitalist economies).
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country's governmental policies in that country's effort to gain more investment
dollars.

14

B. How Are the World's Securities Markets Differentfrom Those of the
United States?
There are significant differences between the securities markets of the
United States and those of foreign countries. 5 The particular differences are
dependent upon the individual countries and their regulations and structure.
The SEC, the regulator of the securities industry in the United States, attempts
to ensure fair and honest markets in the United States by requiring markets to
operate under full and fair disclosure and in a transparent manner.' 6 Other

14. See id. at 93.
15. Harold S. Bloomenthal & Samuel Wolff, Introduction, 10 INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND
SECURITIES REGULATION § 1.04, at 1-39 (Harold S. Bloomenthal & Samuel Wolff eds., 2001).
There is great disparity as to how securities business is conducted around the world.
In the United States, the Glass-Steagall Act forced the separation of commercial
banking and investment banking.... This was also the pattern in Canada, Japan,
Hong Kong, Singapore, Australia, and, to a degree, the United Kingdom. On the other
hand, in Germany and the remainder of continental Europe and in most other parts of
the world, the securities business is an integral part of the banking business....
Id. at 1-39 to 1-40. Another example is the manner in which insider trading is policed on a global basis.
Securities regulation including prohibition of insider trading varies by country.
Regulatory regimes run the gamut, including no prohibition, statutory prohibitions
which are not enforced, prohibitions based on voluntary cooperation, and highly
developed statutory systems enforced by criminal and civil sanctions. Even slight
differences in regulatory schemes can produce dramatically different results.
Lynda M. Ruiz, Note, European Community Directive on Insider Dealing: A Model for Effective
Enforcement of Prohibitions on Insider Trading in International Securities Markets, 33 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 217, 219 (1995); see also Bernard Asher, The Development of a Global Securities Market,in
THE FUTURE FOR THE GLOBAL SECURITIES MARKET 3, 9-10 (Fidelis Oditah ed., 1996) ("Regulators and
governments lay down rules for investment and to protect investors. Depending on how this is done, it can do
much to encourage, or slow down, the globalisation process."). Asher also says that the differences in
regulations across countries may actually prevent corporations from seeking investment in certain countries
due solely to these differences. See id.
16. This includes mandatory filings by corporations listed in the United States. These filings include
financial data and other information used to ascertain the financial health of the listed corporation. In their
treatise, Loss and Seligman summarize the disclosure rules in saying "[tihen, too, there is the recurrent theme
throughout these statutes of disclosure, again disclosure, and still more disclosure. Substantive regulation has
its limits. But '[t]he truth shall make you free.'
LOUIs LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF
SECURITIES REGULATION 8 (4th ed. 2001). In the 1934 Act, "Congress extended the 'disclosure' doctrine of
investor protection to securities listed and registered for public trading.
MARC I. STEINBERG,
UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAW 9 (2d ed. 1996).

In the securities context, a transparent manner is one in which investors can see the most recent trades
in a timely manner (timely transaction reporting), as well as having access to the rules of the market and its
internal operating structure.
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markets may operate pursuant to a similar general principle, but adopt less
stringent regulations. For example, some markets may require disclosure of
certain financial documents, but not to the same extent the SEC requires of U.S.
corporations. These differences are the reason the SEC is concerned with
individual U.S. investors trading on foreign exchanges.
II. THE SEC'S ROLE IN THE REGULATION OF U.S. SECURITIES MARKETS

A. Mission of the SEC
The SEC was created and had its powers enumerated by Congress through
the Securities Act of 1933,17 Securities Exchange Act of 1934,18 and
subsequent legislation. Its mandate concerns oversight of "[t]he distribution of
securities, the activities of brokers and dealers, the operations of stock
exchanges and numerous other activities related to the operation of the
securities markets .... ."19 Although not explicitly stated in the mandate, the
SEC is primarily concerned with the protection of U.S. investors, although
foreign investors, when trading on U.S. markets, are protected as a byproduct of
the actions taken by the SEC to protect U.S. investors.
The SEC has not received specific power from the legislature to regulate
international trades; however, this power is assumed in securities sales
involving U.S. investors and foreign exchanges because of the SEC's
regulatory power and the interpretation of "interstate commerce.,, 20 Up to this
point, the SEC has been able to prevent U.S. investors from trading directly on
17. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (2000). "This Act is concerned by and large with the
initial distribution of securities rather than with their subsequent trading. Securities that are offered to the
public through the mails or the channels of interstate commerce must be registered with the SEC by the
issuer." Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 16, at 38; see also U.S. GOVERNMENT MANUAL 659 (1999-2000).
18. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-mm (2000).
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was addressed to postdistribution trading. The
static disclosure of the 1933 Act was thus transposed into a philosophy of continuous
disclosure through the registration of all securities traded on exchanges, with
rulemaking authority in the Commission to require the filing of periodic reports by
both issuers and certain insiders....
LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 16, at 38.

19. Edward F. Greene et al., Concepts ofRegulation-The U.S. Model, in THE FUTURE FOR THE GLOBAL
SECURITIES MARKET, supra note 15, at 157, 157.
20. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(7) (2000); see also Kellye Y. Testy, Comity and Cooperation: Securities
Regulation in a Global Marketplace, 45 ALA. L. REv. 927, 932 (1994) ("The key jurisdictional phrase is
'interstate commerce' which is defined to include among other things 'trade or commerce in securities or any
transportation or communication relating thereto... between any foreign country and any State, Territory, or
the District of Columbia ... ").

534

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES

[Vol. 9:529

foreign exchanges. 21 In addition, "[t]he lack of regulatory guidance in this
context has discouraged other parties from offering U.S. persons foreign market
access.' 22 As I will demonstrate, however, the time when the SEC will be
forced to make a regulatory decision draws near.
B. The SEC's ProblemsRelated to Globalization
1. Difficulty in Regulatingthe Flow of Capitaloutside the United States
Globalization has led-to a number of problems for the SEC, particularly in
its attempts to regulate securities transactions involving United States citizens.23
Currently, the only way U.S. investors can invest in foreign securities is via
pass-through arrangements. 24 This limitation has simplified the SEC's job as
securities regulator. In the future, the number of U.S. investors investing in
foreign securities may become even greater as the populrity of online
investment increases.2 ' The primary force preventing U.S. investors from
becoming more active in foreign markets is the SEC. Foreign markets' fear that
the SEC will require them to register as U.S. national securities exchanges, and

21. See Unger, supra note 5 (discussing the SEC's role in the prevention of foreign trading despite the
existing technology that would enable this type of trading were it not for the SEC's regulatory rules preventing
foreign exchanges from accepting U.S. investors' transactions).
22. Regulation of Exchanges, Exchange Act Release No. 34-38,672,64 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 1631,1692
(May 23, 1997), available at 1997 WL 276278 [hereinafter Regulation of Exchanges].
23. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 239-40 (prepared statement of Scott Gordon, Chairman, Chicago
Mercantile Exchange) (discussing the current regulatory environment and the impact on the U.S. and world's
financial markets).
24. Unger, supra note 5 ("Investors can link to a foreign market by 'passingthrough' a member of that
market-typically the investor's broker-dealer--using either a proprietary system or the Internet."). For a full
discussion of the steps necessary to trade on a foreign market via the "pass through" approach, see Regulation
of Exchanges, supra note 22, at 1690-92. This pass-through investment arrangement in foreign securities
should not be confused with foreign companies choosing to list on a U.S. stock exchange, thus subjecting
themselves to certain U.S. regulations, through vehicles like American Depository Receipts (ADRs).
An ADR is a negotiable receipt, usually issued by a U.S. bank, which certifies that a
stated number of shares of a foreign private issuer have been deposited in the bank or
in its foreign affiliate or correspondent. Form F-6 is available if(]) the ADR holder
may withdraw the deposited securities at any time (subject to a few mechanical
exceptions, (2) the deposited securities are offered pursuant to a 1933 Act registration
or in transactions that would be exempt if effected in the United States, and (3) the
issuer of the deposited securitiesreports under the 1934 Act.
LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 16, at 185 (emphasis added).
25. Unger, supra note 5 ("The Internet potentially puts access to foreign markets a URL and a couple of
mouse clicks away from any investor with a PC and an on-line brokerage account-and that population of
investors grows daily.").
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are therefore wary of U.S. investors.26 With existing technology, the only
requirement for greater U.S. participation without the SEC's intervention is a
foreign securities market willing to accept U.S. investment capital. 27 Thus, if
the foreign markets begin to accept U.S. investment and the SEC hopes to
protect U.S. investors, a policy to regulate these trades must be established and
applied on a global scale.
2. Inherent Dangersfor U.S. Investors Dealingwith Non-U.S. Markets
The primary concern for the SEC, in terms of U.S. citizens trading on
foreign exchanges, is that U.S. citizens will expect the markets to operate in a
manner similar to the markets the investors typically deal with-U.S. markets
regulated by the SEC. The SEC noted,
Because foreign securities laws are generally not designed to
provide these protections ["assurances that markets and
intermediaries will disclose information regarding the rules
governing trading operations, as well as requirements
regarding transaction reporting and issuer disclosure
practices"] to U.S. investors that directly trade on their
markets, in the absence of disclosure these differences have
the potential to mislead U.S. investors that have come to rely
on the U.S. securities laws.28
As previously noted,29 there are many differences between the U.S. markets
and other equity markets. The markets discussed in Part I B, particularly the
markets in Japan, Germany, and the United Kingdom, are considered to be
similar to U.S. markets. 30 As investors wander into truly foreign markets, the
26. Regulation of Exchanges, supra note 22, at 1692.

[T]he lack of regulatory guidance in this context has discouraged other parties from
offering U.S. persons foreign market access. Similarly, foreign markets have been
reluctant to permit U.S. persons to become members of their markets without
assurances from the Commission that they would not be required to register as
national securities exchanges.
Id.; see also Roger W. Robinson Jr., Are You Investing in Rogue States?, WALL ST. J., July 6, 2001, at A8.
27. See Unger, supra note 5. ("The only real impediments to a global market are regulatory, not
technological.")
28. Regulation of Exchanges, supranote 22, at 1692.
29. See supraPart I.B.

30. See Bloomenthal & Wolff, supranote 15, at 1-40.2 to 1-52 (discussing the general characteristics of
these stock markets along with the similarities and differences in the operation of the markets).
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uncharted waters may become treacherous.3' Thus, the SEC, in an effort to
fulfill its mandate "to provide protection for [U.S.] investors, 32 feels it should
regulate U.S. investors' dealings with foreign equities markets.
3. The SEC's JurisdictionOver Global Securities Transactions
Involving US. Investors
The jurisdiction of the SEC is broad in scope. A speech by SEC
Commissioner Laura Unger addressed the SEC's view of international
regulations, stating, "[t]he obstacles to be overcome in developing a global
regulatory framework for securities trading don't involve any lack of
jurisdiction on the Commission's part. Quite the contrary. The Exchange Act
gives the Commission ample authority over the activities of foreign markets and
broker-dealers in the United States. 3 3 Specifically, the SEC's jurisdiction is
derived from the phrase "interstate commerce." "Interstate commerce"
encompasses among other things "trade or commerce in securities or any
transportation or communication relating thereto ... between any foreign
country and any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia" and would
therefore seemingly cover all trades involving U.S. investors.34

3 1. Bloomenthal & Wolff, supra note 15, at 1-69 ("Investing in the stock market (Bolsa) in Mexico is like
riding a roller coaster, the ups and downs of which are affected by volatile stock prices, repeated devaluations
of the peso, and some of the highest interest rates in the world."). The authors also noted "irregularities" in
trading in that market. Id. at 1-70.
32. U.S. GOVERNMENT MANUAL supra note 17, at 659; see also Securities and Exchange Commission,
The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC ProtectsInvestors and MaintainsMarket Integrity (Dec. 1999), at
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.html [hereinafter Investor's Advocate].
33. Unger, supranote 5; see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 78e. Loss & Seligman
conclude that U.S. securities regulations and the SEC's authority extend to international markets because
"whether the seller [of a security] has agents within the United States or whether the mails are used, by
hypothesis it is impossible to make an offering in the United States from a point outside the country without
using some facility of 'interstate commerce' as that phrase is defined in the statutes." LoSS & SELIGMAN,
supranote 16, at 181.
34. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(7); see also Testy, supra note 20, at 932.
The express provisions of the federal securities laws establish an extremely broad
jurisdictional net. The key jurisdictional phrase is "interstate commerce," which is
defined to include among other things "trade or commerce in securities or any
transportation or communication relating thereto.. between any foreign country and
any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia .. "

2002]

THE SEC'S ROLE IN THE GLOBAL ERA

Hm. THE U.S. INVESTOR'S ROLE IN THE WORLD SECURITIES MARKETS

A. What Is the FinancialStrength of the United States in Relation to World
Markets?
The United States has long been considered an economic superpower. U.S.
capital markets are massive and receive new investment dollars every day.35
One example of foreign markets' desire to gain U.S. investment dollars is found
in Quebec's recent agreement with the Nasdaq. "Nasdaq and the Quebec
government are aiming to 'provide Quebec and Canadian companies with better
access to huge pools of capital, and provide investors with the opportunity to
trade as many securities as possible at the best price.' ' 36 In the process of
negotiating the agreement, the Canadian government agreed to strengthen the
securities laws of Canada. The first phase [in the summer of 2000] of this
agreement will allow Canadians to trade U.S. listed stocks in Montreal. 37 The
second stage will "establish a Canadian market on the Nasdaq trading platform
by March 2001 .38 Canada's acceptance of U.S. companies into their country
and their agreement to follow more U.S.-like securities laws indicates how
strong the lure of U.S. investment dollars can be, even to an industrialized
country with a strong economy like Canada.
B. Why Do ForeignMarkets Want to Attract U.S. Investors? (Why Would
Foreign Markets Agree to SEC Regulation?)
Money is a highly liquid asset that countries can use to build up
infrastructure and improve their economy. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah emphasized
the length nations will go to attract capital, stating, "In the current age of
globalization, capital is much more mobile than labor.., sovereign countries
aim to attract both portfolio and direct [foreign] investment by lowering their

35. "U.S. pension fund holdings in foreign shares are expected to grow substantially over the next few
years from approximately $475 billion in 1996 to $940 billion by 2001." Douglas M. Atkin, Instinet,
Comment on Securities and Exchange Commission File No. S7-16-97 (Oct. 3, 1997), at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/s71697/atkin1.htm.
36. Quebec bringingNasdaq to Canada,LETHBRIDGE HERALD, Apr. 27, 2000 (quoting Lucian Bouchard,
Quebec Premier), availableat 2000 WL 16481643.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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tax rates on income earned by foreigners., 39 With the advent of the Internet
and improving communications, once the regulatory barriers are removed,
anyone could invest in a foreign country, as long as the investor has access to a
computer and a modem. 40 Thus, by gaining SEC approval, foreign markets can
instantly gain access to massive amounts of foreign capital. 4' Not only will this
capital be invested in a foreign country's corporations, but the government will
receive tax dollars from U.S. investors and, presumably, a boost in the foreign
market's stock valuations due to the increase in demand.
IV. THE SEC'S PROPOSALS TO REGULATE INVESTMENTS

In 1997 the SEC issued a concept release recognizing the changes in the
world's securities markets brought about by globalization.4 2 In the release, the
SEC proposed three potential solutions to the problems associated with
regulation of international securities markets. The proposals were: (1) a mutual
recognition approach, a3 (2) a direct exchange regulation approach," and (3) an
access regulation approach.4 5 As viewed through the lens of globalization
theory, each of these proposals has some advantages as well as some

39. Reuven S.Avi-Yonah, Globalization,Tax Competition, andthe FiscalCrisisofthe Welfare State, 113
HARV. L. REv. 1575, 1575-76 (2000). Indeed, some developing countries, in an effort to attract foreign
investment, have lowered tax rates on foreign nationals to levels lower than the tax rates of citizens.
What has not been subjected to legal test, however, is the issue of tax discrimination
which favours aliens and operates against indigenous people. As a result ofthis gap in
jurisprudence, the leaders of a number of developing countries recognize the need to
exploit the above sovereign right in international law in order to attract foreign
investors through lofty fiscal incentives. In pursuance of this effort, a number of
governments in developing countries have enacted legislation which offers generous
fiscal incentives to foreign investors.
MWENDA, supra note 8, at 8 (citations omitted).
40. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 851 (1997) (defining cyberspace as "a unique medium... located
in no particular geographic location but available to anyone, anywhere in the world, with access to the
Internet"); Unger, supranote 5 ("The technological underpinnings of a global securities market already are in
place.... The only real impediments to a global market are regulatory, not technological.").
41. For example,
U.S. pension funds have more than doubled their international investments over the
past five years. These investments are expected to increase further from 8% of assets
in 1994 to 12.5% by the end of 1999. This would increase overseas funds to $725
billion from $300 billion, 19.3% compound growth rate during the period.
Asher, supra note 15, at 4.
42. Regulation of Exchanges, supranote 22.
43. See id. at 1693-94.
44. See id.at 1694-95.
45. See id. at 1695-1702.
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disadvantages. The remainder of this note will weigh the pros and cons of the
SEC's three proposals to determine which plan would most effectively regulate
securities markets in this era of globalization.
A. Mutual Recognition
The first proposal, dubbed the mutual recognition approach, allows the
SEC to "rely on a foreign market's primary regulatory authority if [the SEC]
determined that the foreign authority provided 'comparable' regulation to U.S.
exchange regulation." 46 After the SEC has determined that the foreign market
has sufficiently similar regulations and enforcement mechanisms, the SEC will
take a hands-off approach and let the local regulatory agency protect U.S.
investors by enforcing the local regulations.
1. What the SEC Will Look for to Determine "Comparable"Exchanges
Obviously, the first difficulty faced by the SEC is determining what factors
lead to having regulations "comparable" to U.S. securities regulations. Some of
the factors the SEC will look at include "efficient structures," "sound disclosure
systems," and "fair and honest markets. ' ' 7 Efficient structures include
"quotation, price, and volume information dissemination, order routing, order
execution, clearance, settlement, and payment, as well as strong capital
adequacy standards. . . .,4s Sound disclosure systems would include
"accounting principles, auditing standards, auditor independence standards,
registration and prospectus provisions, and listing standards that provide
investor protection yet balance costs and benefits for market participants...."A9
The third factor, fair and honest markets, would ensure "regulation of abusive
sales practices, prohibitions against fraudulent conduct, and high levels of
enforcement cooperation." 50 Just because a country can demonstrate that its
market has all of these regulations, however, does not mean that it will receive

46. Unger, supranote 5.
47. Regulation of International Securities Markets, Securities Act Release No. 33-6807, 34-26284, 42
S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 284, 284 (Nov. 14, 1988), available at 1988 WL 902407.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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approval. Most markets have similar mechanisms; the only difference is the
degree of disclosure, fairness, and efficient markets."
2. Advantages to SEC's Plan
Due to the SEC's lack of direct intervention under the mutual recognition
approach, some of the groups favoring this plan include foreign exchanges,
regulators, and fnms. 52 The foreign regulators' preference to retain their
autonomy 53 while gaining U.S. investment capital makes the mutual recognition
approach a foreign country's ideal solution. This approach would also lead to
internal advantages for the SEC, such as the ability to focus on domestic
markets once a foreign market has received the SEC's approval.
One of the more difficult tasks facing the SEC is to regulate the world's
securities markets. The difficulty lies in the massive amount of manpower
required to police domestic as well as foreign markets-not to mention foreignrelation problems. By relying on foreign regulatory agencies to regulate their
individual markets, the SEC is able to4 lessen its already imposing burden by
focusing solely on the United States.1
In addition, by requiring a certain level of regulation in order to receive
U.S. investment dollars, the SEC would be able to raise the standards of global
regulation. One of the primary concerns for globalists- is a "race to the
bottom," 55 a race that will be halted before it begins if the SEC mandates global
standards in order to receive the SEC's blessing.

51. See supra Part H.B for further discussion of the degree of differences between U.S. markets and their
foreign counterparts.
52. See Jorg Franke, Comment on Securities and Exchange Commission File No. S7-16-97 (Oct. 3,1997),
at http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/s7l697/frankel.htm. Franke, Executive Board member of Deutsche
Borse, the operating company for Germany's leading securities exchange, noted, "Deutsche Borse believes
that foreign exchanges contemplating limited activities and maintaining a limited physical presence in the
United States should generally be permitted to offer membership to registered broker-dealers and to other
highly sophisticated investors in the United States on the basis of their home country regulation .. " Id.; see
also Unger, supra note 5.
53. Enrico Colombatto & Jonathon R. Macey, A Public Choice Model of International Economic

Cooperation and the Decline of the Nation State, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 925, 926 (1996) ("All else equal,
regulators would prefer not to cede or to share authority with their counterparts from other countries.").
54. For further discussion on the SEC's difficulties in regulating the world's securities markets, see infra
Part IV.B.3.b detailing the inherent problems with policing the world's markets.
55. The Race to the Bottom theory indicates that, in the competition for global business, countries will
lower their standards in an effort to gain business. For example, ifa country wishes to attract heavy industry,
it may lower the pollution standards so more corporations will look at the country as a place where it is
cheaper to do business.
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Foreign exchanges have expressed interest in teaming up with the United
States in order to gain a competitive edge in the fight for investment dollars.
The effect of foreign investments extends even to markets considered to be
primarily domestic. "The dynamism of domestic markets depends ultimately
56
on the capacity of domestic firms and networks of firms to compete globally.
The recent agreement between the Nasdaq and Montreal's exchange is one
example of how the SEC's proposal will raise the level of regulation up to
United States standards.57 Countries realize that a failure to gain the SEC's
approval will result in the loss of potential foreign investment.58 Thus, rather
than the feared "race to the bottom," the potential to gain the SEC's approval
will result in a race to the top, or at least a race to the SEC's minimum
standards. The Mutual Recognition proposal, and the minimum standards it
will create, is similar to the European Union's current attempt at
harmonization.5 9
3. PotentialProblemsFacingthe SEC
The potential pitfalls of the SEC's plan are numerous and likely to prevent
the enactment of this approach. The first difficulty is that of losing exchanges
to foreign countries. With the growth of technology and the elimination of the
necessity of a physical trading floor, exchanges are not tied to one particular
location. Therefore an exchange seeking a less restrictive set of regulations

56. Manuel Castells, The Global Economy, in THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS READER, supra note l, at

259, 260 (discussing the worldwide competition brought about by globalization.).
57. "'This tells us we were right to go ahead with Nasdaq because in a globalizing world, Quebec would

have been left in a less competitive position,' said Hubert Bolduc, spokesman for Bernard Landry, Quebec's
Finance Minister." Kathryn Leger, Quebec Was "Right" to go with Nasdaq: But Province Says TSE Move
Positivefor Investors, NATIONAL POST, June 8, 2000, at C3, available at 2000 WL 21838485.
58. See id.
59. See Todd A. Sulger, Comment, Harmonization of Securities Market Regulations in the European
Union: Is the Price Tag Too High?, 29 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 221 (1998).

[T]he EU has attempted to harmonize the security regulation requirements of each
member state by establishing minimum security information disclosure standards.
Although the minimum standards in most cases may not be lowered by a member
state, the standards generally can be raised. Each member state must adopt these

binding regulations into legislation; however, each member state retains the choice as
to the form and method of implementation it wishes to employ to move the directive
into national law. Ultimately, the EU expects to achieve a minimum standard of
quality and accessibility in the securities markets by fostering a level of cooperation
among national supervisory bodies.
Id. at 224.
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could move to an "approved" country and still retain access to U.S. investors.6 °
The advantage to the exchanges and corporations that decide to move is a
lessening of regulations and the avoidance of the SEC's watchful eye.
The second problem lies in the approval process. Certain governments
would press for their exchanges to be recognized despite significant
shortcomings. This could result in a political rather than a regulatory decision
due to the impact that the U.S. investment dollar could have on an exchange.6 1
An example of a potential problem is the found in different disclosure
requirements in Japan and the United States. One of the SEC's mandates is to
"ensure that securities markets are fair and honest,, 62 something that a lack of
disclosure prevents. The choices faced by the SEC would be to solicit a change
in Japan's corporate secrecy laws; deny the Japanese markets approval for
securities trading with U.S. investors, or accept Japan's differences, even
though these differences tilt the playing field in favor of Japanese nationals and
against U.S. investors. It is conceivable that the U.S. government would
pressure the SEC simply to accept Japan's differences and issue approval to the
markets.
4. Why the Mutual Recognition Solution Will Work
The predicted results of the SEC's first proposal can best be viewed
through a variation of the hyper-globalist theory.6 3 However, rather than a race
to the bottom, foreign markets desiring increased foreign investment dollars
will raise their standards to meet the SEC's more stringent requirements
because of the desirability of U.S. investment dollars.
The use of the Mutual Acceptance model would result in higher standards
throughout the world, standards similar to U.S. standards. The uniformity of
the securities markets would result in an ease of trading on markets throughout
the globe. The Mutual Recognition proposal is an application of "mandated
reciprocity"6 4 that could lead to "global public policy" similar to the banking
60. See Unger, supra note 5.
61. See id.
62. U.S. GOVERNMENT MANUAL, supra note 17, at 659; see also Investor's Advocate, supranote 32.
63. "For the hyper-globalisation school, global markets are now perfectly integrated--even for non-tradable
goods and services multinational corporations can enter domestic markets. With consumers able to buy
products from around the globe and producers able to locate in or source from any site, the notion of a national
economy becomes redundant." Jonathan Perraton et al., EconomicActivity in a Globalizing World, in THE
GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS READER 287, 287 (David Held & Anthony McGrew eds., 2000).
64. WOLFGANG H. REINICKE, GLOBAL PUBLIC POLICY: GOVERNING WITHOUT GOVERNMENT? 110

(1985).
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industry in the 1980s. If the SEC were to combine with other regulatory
agencies in order to ensure similar regulations, it is possible that a new global
agency would be formed. David Lake noted this trend, "As globalization
occurs, states lose control over their destinies, problems become 'bigger' than
the capacities of individual governments, and states must delegate and possibly
abdicate political authority to supranational entities with powers that more
nearly coincide with the scope ofthe issues and actors to be managed. 6 5 Once
it becomes apparent that individual countries do not have the capacity to
regulate the international transactions of their citizens, this new agency will be
necessary. The mutual recognition approach will have laid the groundwork for
global securities regulations and this approach could succeed.
5. Why It Won't Work
The use of the mutual recognition approach could violate the Westphalian
model of autonomy and countries may resent the control of the SEC. A similar
problem and result can be seen in the harmonization of securities laws in the
European Union. Krasner states, "arrangements within the European Union
such as mutual recognition, which allows entities operating in one state to be
governed by the laws of another, have violated the Westphalian model.
Individual states retain the formal right to renounce the Union. . . Ibut the
costs would be very high."66
Foreign countries would also resent the Americanization of international
securities markets. In Jihad vs. McWorld, Benjamin Barber observed the
67
Americanization phenomenon and the resulting feelings toward Americans.
This sentiment and the competitiveness between regulatory agencies will make
it difficult for the SEC or any U.S. agency to impose its will on foreign
country's securities markets without a backlash. 68 David S. Pottruck of Charles

65. David A. Lake, Global Governance: A Relational Contracting Approach, in GLOBALIZATION AND
GOVERNANCE, supra note 4, at 31, 42.

66. Stephen D. Krasner, Compromising Westphalia, in THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS READER, supra
note 1, at 124, 127.
67. Benjamin Barber, Jihadvs. Mc World, in THE GLOBALIZATION READER 21 (Frank J. Lechner& John
Boli eds., 2000) (discussing Americanization and the competing theories).
68. See Colombatto & Macey, supra note 53, at 933.
[A]ll regulatory entities will engage in wealth-maximizing behavior. They will attempt
to maximize the rough "value of their [bureaucracies], subject to technological,
market, and statutory restraints and principal-agent difficulties." Second, any given
regulatory authority competes with other regulatory authorities for whatever it is that
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Schwab notes, the resentment could also lead to an imposition of increased
restrictions on U.S. markets by foreign regulatory agencies.69
B. Exchange Regulation-SECRequires the ForeignMarkets Providing
Direct Access to the United States to Register as U.S. Exchanges
The SEC's second approach to global regulation is the application of U.S.
securities laws to all foreign markets seeking U.S. investment. In this approach,
"The Commission could require foreign markets that provide direct access to
U.S. investors to register as U.S. exchanges or use our [the SEC's] authority

under section 36 of the Exchange Act to provide them with an exemption from
exchange registration." 70 The SEC would be responsible for enforcing its
regulations, as opposed to the local government's enforcement of their own
securities laws as seen in the mutual recognition approach.
1. What Will ForeignExchanges Do to Receive SEC Approval?

Although it is not difficult to ascertain what steps an exchange must take in
order to obtain approval under the direct regulation proposal, the actual
approval process could be a near impossibility, keeping U.S. investors out of
foreign markets 7 ' despite the SEC's best efforts under this proposal. Each
exchange would have to examine its current regulations and ensure that each
regulation is in conformity with all current U.S. securities laws. This process

they are attempting to maximize. This competitive behavior will occur on a national
as well as an international level.
Id.
69. See David S. Pottruck, President and Co-chief Executive Officer, Charles Schawb, Comment on
Securities
and
Exchange
Commission
File No.
S7-16-97
(Oct.
3,
1997),
at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/s7l697/pottruc2.htm ("We believe foreign regulators are likely to impose
restrictions on the routing of orders to the U.S. equal to or greater than the restrictions the Commission places

on orders routed to their countries. This issue of reciprocity should be of significant concern to the
Commission.").
70. Unger, supranote 5; see also Regulation of Exchanges, supra note 22, at 1695 ("Foreign markets that
offer their services to U.S. persons would have to comply with the same regulatory obligations as U.S.
exchanges.").
71. Franke, supranote 52.
[T]he procedural burdens and costs of submitting to a second regulatory regime, with

different information disclosure standards and recordkeeping and other regulatory
requirements, will deter foreign exchanges that contemplate only limited activities in
the United States from offering membership to registered broker-dealers and highly

sophisticated investors in the United States.
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could require the foreign exchange to alter its current laws to fit U.S. laws, and
thus, in the worst-case scenario, be in violation of contradicting local securities
regulations.
2. Advantages
Uniformity is the primary advantage of this proposal. As the SEC noted,
"[t]his approach also could ensure that any foreign markets that offer services to
U.S. investors would provide the same protections as registered or exempted
exchanges, such as disclosure of trading rules, transparency,
timely transaction
72
reporting, and T+3 clearance and settlement.
There are two primary benefits to uniformity. The first advantage is that
U.S. investors would understand the foreign market's rules, assuming the
investor understands the U.S. regulations. Ensuring that U.S. investors
understand the rules of the foreign markets is one of the most cited reasons for
establishing international regulation of the securities markets. The second
advantage obtained through uniformity is the establishment of world securities
regulations. This would eliminate corporations and exchanges from "exchange
shopping," where the entity searches for the country in which the most
favorable rules exist, while still retaining access to investor capital.73
3. Disadvantages
The disadvantages to this proposal are as numerous as they are serious.
Some of the major disadvantages include: (1) the impracticality of the
proposal; (2) the potential for regulatory retaliation by foreign agencies; (3)the
risk of subjecting exchanges to two, potentially inconsistent, sets of laws; and
(4) the existence of statutory limitations that may prevent the SEC from
completely regulating foreign securities markets. Charles Schwab's comment
to the SEC's proposal summarized the weaknesses best by stating, "this
restriction would completely defeat the purpose of cross-border securities
74
trading.

72. Regulation of Exchanges, supranote 22, at 1695.
73. See Unger, supra note 5 ('The primary benefit of this approach is that it eliminates the problem of
regulatory arbitrage.").
74. Pottruck, supranote 69.
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a. Practicality
Forcing the SEC to patrol the world's securities markets, or at least those
markets choosing to register with the SEC, is a monumental task. As SEC
Commissioner Laura Unger noted, "[e]ven if [the SEC] had access to unlimited
resources, which [it] obviously do[es] not, a U.S. regulator would be hardpressed to accomplish that task.",75 Certain foreign exchanges view this
proposal as one with flaws that would defeat its primary purpose of creating
opportunities for global securities trading.7 6 Additionally, some foreign
exchanges also view this as an "impossible burden" to meet.7 7
b. Retaliation by Foreign Governments
"Countries jealously protect their sovereignty, and under international law,
have the right to use armed force to do so. ''78 Although this reaction may seem
extreme, it is true that the SEC's direct regulation of foreign markets would be
seen as an assault on a foreign government. This proposed action by the SEC
could warrant a counteraction by a foreign government whose rights have been
infringed upon by a U.S. regulatory agency. Additionally, the foreign
countries' securities regulation agencies will feel as if their independence has
been diminished by an imperialistic U.S. action. "[L]ike dominant firms in any
domestic market, a country's dominant financial regulator must worry about
foreign competition., 79 Foreign regulatory agencies will not consider the
SEC's enforcement of U.S. securities laws to be particularly helpful. In fact,
75. Unger, supranote 5.
76. See Mitsuhide Yamaguchi, President & CEO, Toyko Stock Exchange, Comments on Securities and
Exchange Commission File No. S7-16-97, at http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/s71697/yamaguc l.txt (Oct. 3,
1997).
If the SEC requires foreign exchanges or issuers to follow certain procedures to

register or to be exempted from such registration, there is a strong possibility of
hindering the cross-border transactions of U.S. investors. The introduction of such a
registration system would impose temporary and continuous cost increases upon the
foreign markets and issuers capable of providing U.S. investors with a variety of
investment vehicles.
Id.
77. Franke, supra note 52 ("Imposing a U.S. exchange registration requirement on foreign securities
exchanges with limited activities in the United States may, as the Commission recognizes, represent an
impossible burden for foreign exchanges and their members.").
78. Colombatto & Macey, supranote 53, at 925.
79. Edward J. Kane, Tension Between Competition and Coordination in InternationalFinancial
Regulation, in GOVERNING BANKING'S FUTURE: MARKETS VS. REGULATION 33, 36 (Catherine England ed.,

1991).
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most governments would view this action as a direct assault on the sovereign
rights of the government.
Although the reactions of foreign governments would vary, one likely
method of retaliation would be to require those U.S. exchanges receiving
investments from foreigners to register as an exchange in the foreign country.8 0
This would force the U.S. exchange to comply with the foreign government's
regulations, similar to what the SEC would do to the foreign exchanges seeking
U.S. investment. The most apparent problem would be if multiple governments
placed contradictory or mutually exclusive regulations on the U.S. exchanges,
forcing the exchanges to choose specific markets from which to seek
investment and spurn some potentially lucrative markets because of the
government's securities laws. Other possible government reactions could go so
far as the aforementioned military retaliation against the U.S. because of their
infringement on foreign governments' sovereignty. 8 '
c. Markets Would Become Subject to Two Sets of Potentially
InconsistentLaws
The problem that U.S. exchanges might face in registering under the
retaliation scenario could also be present for foreign exchanges that need to
comply with only two sets of regulations-the SEC's and the host
government's. Although most securities regulations attempt to accomplish the
same goals, fairness, transparency, etc., the various regulatory agencies tackle
this problem under different assumptions and, potentially, different sets of
rules.
d Legal Limits on SEC Regulation of Foreign Markets
In a legal sense, the SEC does not face any restrictions in regulating
transactions involving U.S. investors. However, by imposing regulations on a
foreign market, the SEC would inadvertently be regulating transactions taking
place between two foreign entities, a foreign investor and a foreign market.
The SEC lacks the jurisdiction to regulate this type of transaction.

80. See Pottruck, supra note 69 (detailing the retaliation that will likely be imposed on those U.S.
companies seeking foreign investors for U.S. markets).
81. Colornbatto & Macey, supra note 53, at 925.
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4. Why the Exchange Regulation Solution Will Work
The only positive aspect of this approach is that the world will have at least
one set of global securities regulations, assuming foreign markets wish to
receive U.S. investment dollars. This uniformity will allow investors from
throughout the world to invest in foreign markets and understand the rules by
which the markets work.
5. Why It Won't Work
Having the SEC regulate the world's securities markets will be seen by
foreign governments as a gross exercise of U.S. imperialism and by the SEC as
a nearly impossible task.
Today, it is argued, imperialism has acquired a new form as
formal empires have been replaced by new mechanisms of
multilateral control and surveillance, such as the G7 and
World Bank. As such, the present epoch is described by many
Marxists not in terms of globalization, but instead as a new
mode of Western imperialism dominated by the needs and
requirements of2 finance capital within the world's major
8
capitalist states.
The SEC's proposal would simply result in the elimination of other Western
partners and be a U.S. attempt at global era imperialism.
The second difficulty is retaliation, though this need not be direct or overt
retaliation. A problem the European Union faces, which will likely be faced by
the SEC and U.S. corporations seeking to list their shares in foreign markets, is
the minor differences found in each market.
Each time an issuer seeks to list a security in a member state, it
must comply with the admissions directive requirements of
that member state. Thus, the Stock Exchange Directives do
not completely harmonize securities regulation requirements
in member states. Rather, the directives set a minimum
standard for compliance. Domestic law in each member state
where listing is sought must still be consulted to determine any
82. Held & McGrew, supra note 1, at 5.
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additional requirements the state mandates about the
directives' minimum requirements.8 3
A similar difficulty could face the SEC and the world securities markets.
Once the SEC grants approval to certain markets, those markets will likely
grant approval to U.S. markets. The companies and markets seeking to list will
be able to list, in a technical sense; however, each entity will be required to
meet differing standards in order to list with each country.84 The foreign
countries may impose restrictions on U.S. companies similar to those placed on
foreign corporations and markets seeking U.S. regulatory approval.
6. HybridApproach of Exchange Regulation
Some foreign exchanges have proposed that the SEC directly regulate the
foreign exchanges in a limited manner. In a comment on the SEC's proposal,
Deutsche B6rse AG suggested that the SEC should allow "qualified U.S.
persons" to trade on foreign exchanges if the foreign exchanges meet certain
conditions. The conditions suggested by Deutsche B6rse include: (1) quarterly
reporting to the SEC regarding "the volume of trading involving U.S. members
as compared to overall trading volume on the foreign exchange,"; (2)85
providing information "regarding the location ofU.S. member terminals; (3),,86
"providing notice... [of] changes to the securities laws and regulations of [the]
home country,";8 7 and (4) "providing notice of any material changes to the
constitution, rules, or operating procedures of the foreign exchange. 8 8 While
this suggestion eliminates some of the disadvantages of the Exchange
Regulation approach, it also eliminates the primary advantage, uniformity of
regulations, and is therefore unlikely to receive approval.

83. Sulger, supranote 59, at 227-28.
84. See Testy, supra note 20, at 933 ("The extraterritorial application of domestic securities law to
transnational transactions results in duplicative or inconsistent regulation, and thereby impedes the free flow
of capital across borders.").
85. Franke, supra note 52.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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C. Access Regulation-SECRegulates the Entities that Actually Provide
Access to Trade on the ForeignExchanges
In the access regulation approach, the SEC would "regulate the access
providers to foreign markets, including broker-dealers, rather than regulating
the foreign markets themselves."8 9 This proposal represents the middle ground
in terms of the SEC's options. Rather than relying on regulation by a foreign
regulatory agency or direct SEC regulation of a foreign exchange, this approach
allows the SEC to regulate only those entities providing U.S. investors with
links to a foreign market. Thus, the difficulties associated with regulation of
transactions not involving U.S. investors would be eliminated,90 as would the
concerns about having foreign regulatory agencies regulating transactions
involving U.S. investors.
1. What Is Access Regulation?
In order for a U.S. citizen to trade a stock on a foreign exchange, the
investor must go through a member of the foreign exchange and have that
member execute the trade on his behalf. Typically, the U.S. investor will
contact his brokerage firm and have the brokerage firm act as the intermediary
between himself and the foreign exchange member. The SEC proposal will
regulate the U.S. broker to ensure that the investor receives the necessary level
of protection. Under this approach, the SEC will require those broker-dealers
who enable U.S. investors to trade directly on a foreign exchange to register as
securities information processors (SIPs). 9 1 SIPs are subject to a lower level of
Typically, this regulation includes meeting watered-down
regulation.
requirements for record keeping, reporting, and disclosure, and complying with
certain anti-fraud rules.
Those markets which lack the technology to enable investors to trade
directly on the exchange will also be regulated in a manner similar to the
regulation of SIPs because the "access is provided in a manner that is
functionally equivalent to that provided by SIP access providers, it presents the
same risks to U.S. investors."9 2 Thus, the SEC would be able to regulate the

89. Regulation of Exchanges, supra note 22, at 1695.
90. See supra Part IV.B for a discussion on the SEC's regulation of transactions involving foreign

exchanges and foreign investors.
91. See § I IA of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78k-1, for a further discussion of SIPs.
92. Regulation of Exchanges, supra note 22, at 1695.
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transactions made by U.S. investors without setting up an elaborate scheme to
regulate world securities markets, nor relying on the local enforcement of
regulations similar to those present in the United States.
2. Advantages
The SEC would be able to avoid "stepping on foreign governments' toes,"
thus enabling U.S. investors to gain access to regulated foreign markets while
not incurring the wrath or retaliation of foreign governments. The only
transactions regulated by this approach are those that take place in the United
States, and the only entities regulated by the SEC are those entities that provide
the connection between the investor and the foreign market. Some foreign
exchanges appear ready to accept this level of regulation. 93
Unlike the Direct Regulation approach, the Access Provider approach
would avoid any potential Constitutional problems because regulation occurs
only in the United States. Additionally, this form of regulation is already taking
place, but on a smaller scale.94 The SEC would also not give up any regulatory
power, in contrast to the mutual recognition approach.95
With this approach, the SEC is still able to accomplish its stated
objectives-to protect the U.S. investor, ensure that markets operate fairly, and
enforce the securities laws 96-but with less manpower than the direct regulation
approach would require, and far less dependence on foreign regulatory agencies
than the mutual recognition approach requires.
3. Disadvantages
The only real problem facing the SEC, if it chooses to adopt this approach
would be the ability of the regulated entities (i.e. the middle men) to ensure fair
markets abroad. It is true that the SEC would regulate the access providers,
however, some foreign markets may choose not to operate the markets in a fair
manner, thus creating a potential problem for the SEC because of the lack of

93. See Franke, supranote 52 ("Deutsche Borse would also not be averse to an approach to monitoring the
activities of foreign exchanges in the United States that would require foreign exchanges to register with the
Commission as 'securities information processors' and to comply with certain minimal substantive
requirements respecting their U.S. activities.").
94. The SEC already regulates SIPs. See Securities Exchange Act § I IA.
95. See Pottruck, supranote 69 ("A mutual recognition regulatory scheme might result in some short-term
loss of control for the Commission.").
96. U.S. GOVERNMENT MANUAL, supra note 17, at 659.
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control it would have over those rogue markets. This problem would not,
however, defeat the SEC's mandate to protect U.S. investors as long as the
differences in markets are fully disclosed. Mitsuhide Yamaguchi, President and
CEO of the Tokyo Stock Exchange, stated, "[i]f the SEC were to introduce the
concept of an 'access provider' into the U.S. regulatory fiamework, it should
limit such regulation to a relatively narrow range of requirements, such as
disclosure of differences in investor protections between the U.S. and foreign
countries." 97
4. Why the Access ProviderSolution Will Work
SEC Commissioner Laura Unger noted that the Access Provider proposal
seemed to be the one being given the most serious
consideration. By regulating only the U.S. activities of the
foreign market or third party entities, it might reduce some of
the conflicts between U.S. and home country regulations. It
might also alleviate concerns that the Commission would
overstep its statutory authority by regulating foreign market
activity in the home country.98
The interesting aspect of this proposal is that unlike the other proposals, the
access provider solution does not infringe on any other nation's rights. This
proposal would seem to run contrary to some globalization theories, which
advocate one world rather than a number of countries interacting with one
another. While it is true that the access provider regulation proposal does run
contrary to some globalization theories like the erosion of borders theory, the
proposal does not reject or defeat other globalization theories. Many
globalization theories actually support and provide the justification for SEC
regulation in the first place. Such theories as the time-space compression
theory and increased interdependence have given rise to the SEC's proposals.
In effect, the globalizing world has provided the necessity for the SEC's
regulation, and the access provider regulation is simply the best way to regulate
international securities transactions within the parameters of a world that has
not reached a truly global scale (i.e. a world where political boundaries cease to
be relevant).
97. Yamaguchi, supra note 76.
98. Unger, supra note 5.
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One other theory that supports the Access Provider regulation is that of
local regulation of a global problem. In this theory, the large, global problem
can be solved on a smaller scale. This "approach did not 'obliterate the
distinction of what is national and what is local,' his willingness to define the
national interest by looking beyond national borders to an interdependent global
economy, represents an approach that ultimately would vest most regulatory
decisions at the federal level. . . ."99 Thus, although the SEC's approach of
access regulation is a local solution to a global problem, it is a step in the right
direction, a step that will be acceptable to a globalizing world that has not
reached the ultimate destination.
CONCLUSION
If the SEC wishes to protect U.S. investors in foreign markets, then the
foreign markets must be regulated by the SEC. The SEC's three proposals
would all succeed in providing regulation, although the extent of regulation,
and therefore the ultimate success of the approaches, differs due to factors other
than those associated with pure regulation. The Mutual Recognition approach
could lead to a lack of regulation because the SEC relinquishes control to
another foreign government. Direct Regulation would lead to political
problems because of the SEC's infringement on other government's
sovereignty. The Access Provider approach appears to offer the most hope
because it stands on the middle ground. The SEC would be able to protect U.S.
investors without infringing on foreign states' sovereignty.

99. Alfred C. Aman, Jr., The Globalizing State: A FutureOriented Perspective on the Public/Private
Distinction, Federalism, and Democracy, 31 VAND. J. OF TRANSNT'L L. 769, 867 (1998).

